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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this case the newly constituted Supreme Court adjudicated upon 
anonymity orders granted in respect of the appellants, who had been the 
subjects of asset-freezing orders imposed under anti-terrorism legislation. The 
complex set of facts gave the Court the opportunity to consider the influence 
of the competing rights under articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) upon the pressing issue of restrictions on reporting 
of publicly conducted legal proceedings.  The decision of the Court 
constitutes a reassertion of the importance of press freedom, underpinned by 
article 10, as an essential component of open justice. 
 
FACTS 
 
The appellants were five men upon whom the Administrative Court had 
imposed asset-freezing orders in 2007.1 At the time the court had added 
anonymity orders, which required that the names of the appellants be replaced 
with single initials in all reports of the proceedings. These “blanket bans” 
were continued during the subsequent legal proceedings which challenged the 
asset-freezing orders (the “substantive case”). At the later stages of these 
appeals, the press and media (“the press”), along with HM Treasury, 
requested that that the anonymity orders be set aside. In the substantive case it 
was held by the Supreme Court that the executive had exceeded its powers in 
imposing limitations on the freedom of the individual on the grounds of 
“reasonable suspicion”, without Parliamentary scrutiny.  The asset-freezing 
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1 The asset-freezing orders were imposed under article 4 of the Terrorism (United 
Nations) Order 2006. 
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orders were thereby quashed.2 The issue of anonymity was considered 
separately but in parallel with the hearing on the substantive issue. 
In the case of two of the appellants (known as G and HAY), their names as 
persons under freezing orders were already in the public domain due to a list 
published by the Bank of England in 2005 and they had been further 
identified in various press reports. At the outset of the substantive case, the 
anonymity order had been lifted in respect of the former, Mohammed al-
Ghabra. It had not yet been removed in the case of HAY, who additionally 
had brought a successful action for wrongful imprisonment in which he was 
identified: Youssef v Home Office.3 In Re Guardian the Court noted that no 
evidence had been produced of harm, social or physical, having occurred to 
either of these appellants or their families due to their identities becoming 
known. On this basis, the Court lifted HAY’s anonymity order and declared 
that it would pursue no further discussion of anonymity in respect of G and 
HAY. 
This left the Supreme Court to consider the cases of three brothers A, K 
and M, who were still anonymous, their identities having been ordered to be 
kept confidential at the (non-specific) request of the Treasury with “presumed 
input by the security services”.4 Although the Treasury no longer regarded 
reporting restrictions to be necessary when fresh directions were made in 
respect of the appellants under the new Terrorism Order 2009, the restrictions 
were to be continued  “in the interests of justice” until the matter could be 
determined by the Supreme Court; that is, whether an order whereby the 
disclosure of the appellants” identities would be lawful.  
A and K had left their addresses, were not in contact with their solicitors 
and it was unknown whether they were still in the UK. Therefore the court 
had heard no compelling arguments as to the effect of revealing their 
identities. However revealing their identities would indirectly identify their 
brother, M, and so it was the potential impact on M and his family, upon 
which the appeal focused. He was living with his ex-wife and their five 
children and it was argued on his behalf that revealing him as one of those 
who was challenging the freezing orders would affect their relationships with 
Muslim community, due to their fear of being associated with family.  Further 
concern was expressed about potential “serious damage to his reputation in 
circumstances in which he has not been charged with, or convicted of, any 
criminal offence and so has no opportunity to challenge the substance of the 
allegations against him.”5
2 Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others [2010] UKSC 2. 
3 [2004] EWCA 1884 (QB). 
4 The anonymity orders were imposed according to article 6 of the Terrorism Order 
2006, which provides for “Confidentiality”. 
5 [2010] UKSC 1 at para [21]. 
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In its first reported decision, Lord Rodger delivered a judgment on behalf 
of a unanimous 7-person Supreme Court, strongly endorsing the principle of 
“open justice”. When balancing ECHR article 8 rights to privacy against 
article 10 rights to freedom of expression, the Court concluded that an 
insufficient degree of potential impact upon the former had been established, 
and that it was outweighed by an important general public interest in knowing 
the identity of those challenging freezing orders. The full names of the 
remaining three appellants (anonymity already having been lost for Youssef 
and Mohammed al-Ghabra) were ordered to be available for publication, both 
in the instant case and in the substantive action against the freezing orders 
themselves.  
 
THE DECISION 
 
Lord Rodger began by indicating the extent of the recent growth of 
restrictions on the press freely to report judicial proceedings, repeating 
counsel’s reminder to the court that, “Your first term’s docket reads like 
alphabet soup.”6 Further illustrating what he regarded as “an efflorescence of 
anonymity orders” Lord Rodger recounted calculations that in 8 out of 58 
appeals heard by the House of Lords in 2007 at least one of the parties 
appeared under an initial and in 2008 it was 15 out of 74.7 He then went on to 
allege that the lower courts had granted anonymity orders “without any very 
prolonged consideration and without explaining their thinking…” and recalled 
the warning of Sir Christopher Staughton in Ex P that “when both sides 
agreed that information should be kept from the public, that was when the 
court had to be most vigilant.”8  The context of the decision was, therefore, 
one in which such “blanket anonymity orders” were not to be granted save in 
the most compelling circumstances. 
 
Open Justice  
 
Open justice has been described as “one of the oldest principles of English 
law going back before Magna Carta.”9 Its two main manifestations are public 
attendance at hearings, and the free reporting of these hearings.  Confidence in 
6 Ibid, at para [1]. 
7 My own calculations indicate that in 2009, the comparable figure was 12 out of 49. 
8 Unreported, The Times March  31, 1998. 
9 LNS v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB). See also: “Publicity is the very 
soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against 
improbity. It keeps the judge, while trying, under trial.” Jeremy Bentham, quoted in G 
Nettheim  “The Principle of Open Justice” (1984-6) 8 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 28. 
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the legal system is partially founded upon justice being “seen to be done” and, 
given obvious practical difficulties with widespread first-hand observation, 
press reports have a crucial role in ensuring transparency.  
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets out 
the fundamental entitlement of a defendant to a “fair and public trial”. I have 
italicised the latter aspect, which is qualified by acknowledgement that 
exclusion of the press or the public may be required “…in the interest of 
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so 
require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”10
The court reviewed the historical background to the relationship between 
the press and the courts. Restrictions on open hearings and publication were 
rejected in the 19th century in divorce cases but ultimately Parliament began to 
intervene in 1926 with the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 
according to which restrictions could be placed, not upon details revealing 
identity, but regarding matters publication of which would potentially cause 
injury to public morals.  Further statutory provision restricting publicity 
include section 1 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, where non-
disclosure of the complainant’s name is automatic; and the Official Secrets 
Act 1920 section 8(4), the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 section 39 
(pertaining to children involved in criminal proceedings) and the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sections 44-46. In these last three 
cases anonymity is a matter of judicial discretion.  
The non-statutory restrictions were previously within the inherent 
jurisdiction of High Court, but since the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came 
into force in 2000, the power to make orders of this kind is one of the ways in 
which the UK fulfils its positive obligations under section 6 according to 
which public authorities, such as the courts, to must act compatibility with 
Convention rights.  In extreme cases, when physical safety is an issue, articles 
2 and 3 of the ECHR may be engaged. Lady Justice Hale in Venables and 
Thompson v NGN made an exceptional anonymity order in favour of the 
killers of James Bulger.11  In our case the concern was about the lesser evil of 
harm to reputation and therefore the focus was upon the frequently competing 
rights of article 8, which sets out the right to privacy and family life and the 
10 ECHR art 6(1). 
11 [2001] 2 WLR 1038. This included press restrictions but not solely in terms of 
reporting court proceedings; the injunction was contra mundum, and prohibited 
revealing any facts which would identify the subjects. The complex implications of 
such a decision has been seen in the controversy regarding anonymity following the 
recall of Jon Venables to prison following reported breach of his conditions of 
licence. 
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article 10, the right to freedom of expression. A court may be acting 
unlawfully if, by permitting publication of his identity, it infringed a party’s 
article 8 right to a private and family life.  Additionally under article 8 there 
may also be a positive duty for the court to go farther and, through blanket 
orders, require others, such as the press and journalists, to respect the 
applicant’s private and family life. Whether acting under either negative or 
positive obligations the courts must strike a fair balance between competing 
needs of the individual and the community.  
The community’s competing needs are embodied in the article 10 right to 
freedom of expression. This is compromised when the courts prohibit the 
reporting of the names of the parties to proceedings which, despite being 
heard in open court by those present, are forbidden to be reported to the wider 
public. Article 10(2) stipulates that such restrictions are permitted when 
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of reputation or rights of 
others. As will be seen below, the courts have established that the balancing 
of the competing demands of articles 8 and 10 will be accomplished by 
invoking the principle of proportionality. 
 
RE S AND “BBC” 
   
Two recent cases illustrate prevailing judicial attitudes to the relationship 
between article 8 and article 10. In Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions 
on Publication)12 a request was made on behalf of a child for an injunction 
against naming the defendant in a murder trial, in which his mother was 
charged with the murder of his brother. The situation was not covered by 
section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, the child not being 
“a child concerned in the proceedings, either as being the person by or against 
or in respect of whom the proceedings were taken, or as being a witness 
therein.” The outcome was in favour of open justice despite claims that 
publicity regarding the child could lead to risks to his health and well-being.  
Lord Steyn said in his leading speech: “…the ordinary rule is that the 
press, as the watchdog of the public, may report everything that takes place in 
a criminal court. I would add that in European jurisprudence and in domestic 
practice this is a strong rule. It can only be displaced by unusual or 
exceptional circumstances. It is, however, not a mechanical rule. The duty of 
the court is to examine with care each application for a departure from the rule 
by reason of rights under article 8.”13 But exceptions should be rare:  “…it 
needs to be said clearly and unambiguously that the court has no power to 
create by a process of analogy, except in the most compelling circumstances, 
12 [2004] UKHL 47. 
13 Ibid, at para [18]. 
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further exceptions to the process of open justice.”14 He cited R v Legal Aid 
Board e p Kaim Todner, where Lord Woolf said, “The need to be vigilant 
arises from the natural tendency for the general principles to be eroded and for 
exceptions to grow by accretion as the exceptions are applied by analogy to 
existing cases. This is the reason it is so important not to forget why 
proceedings are required to be subjected to the full glare of a public 
hearing.”15 In a judgment which invoked the balancing of articles 8 and 10, 
according to the principle of proportionality, the House of Lords in S declined 
to grant an injunction against publication revealing identity. According to 
Lord Steyn: 
 
“A criminal trial is a public event. The principle of open justice puts, 
as has often been said, the judge and all who participate in the trial 
under intense scrutiny. The glare of contemporaneous publicity 
ensures that trials are properly conducted. It is a valuable check on the 
criminal process. Moreover, the public interest may be as much 
involved in the circumstances of a remarkable acquittal as in a 
surprising conviction. Informed public debate is necessary about all 
such matters. Full contemporaneous reporting of criminal trials in 
progress promotes public confidence in the administration of justice. It 
promotes the values of the rule of law.”16
 
Any account of the trial would be “very much disembodied” and with a 
lesser impact on the audience, if it did not the reveal of the identity of the 
defendant.  
Subsequently the House of Lords confronted similar issues in Atty-Gen Ref 
No 3 of 1999: Application by the BBC to set aside or vary a reporting 
restriction order (hereafter BBC).17 In 1999 “D” had been acquitted of rape, a 
matter that was freely reported according to the principle of open justice.  
However one year later an Attorney General’s reference was made 
challenging this acquittal and this hearing was accompanied by an anonymity 
order (imposed by the Court of Appeal upon a statutory basis later doubted by 
the Law Lords). Some nine years later, a BBC programme challenged this 
anonymity order. Under section 78 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
changed the law on double jeopardy, the BBC intended to reveal “new and 
compelling evidence” that D’s DNA matched that at the crime scene as part of 
a press campaign for a re-trial.  
14 Ibid, at para [20]. 
15 [1999] 1 QB 966, at 977. 
16 [2004] UKHL 47, at para [31]. 
17 [2009] UKHL 34. 
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The link that his DNA sample provided was held to be information in 
respect of which D had a reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby engaging 
article 8. However the proposed BBC programme on “controversial 
acquittals” raised matters of general public interest, including the issues of 
indiscriminate storage of DNA and reform of the abolition of double jeopardy 
rule. It will be seen that this quality of “general public interest” is one which 
lends particular “article 10 weight” to any calculation of proportionality. Here, 
this debate would lose cogency if it could not be linked to facts and 
circumstance of actual cases. In conclusion, although it was acknowledged 
that there would be a significant interference with D’s article 8 rights, denial 
of anonymity was ultimately proportionate to the need, in a democratic 
society, for the public to be aware of controversial matters of criminal justice. 
The significant aspects of the anonymity orders in Re Guardian were: 
firstly, that the applicants were attempting to block their identification in 
reports concerning basic facts the truth of which they did not dispute: that 
they had been the subjects of asset-freezing orders. Secondly, these “blanket 
bans” were so extensive in their reach (enforceable against even those writing 
in sympathy with the appellants) that they required justification under article 
10(2) as necessary in a democratic society in order to ensure protection of M’s 
article 8 rights to a private and family life.18 Lord Rodger reiterated that the 
anonymity orders under consideration imposed not only self-constraints on 
the courts but were “sweeping” in their effect upon the press.  
The subject matter under debate was a key determinant in the Court’s 
approach. The asset-freezing orders in the substantive case were executive 
orders under the terrorism legislation and the appeals challenging them take 
the form of judicial review.19 The foundations of the orders, however, are 
closely allied to criminal matters and it is clear that the principles underlying 
this anonymity case belong to the branch of privacy law which includes S and 
BBC. It has more differences than similarities to “celebrity privacy” situations 
(discussed below), which do not directly concern the principle of open justice.  
 
EUROPEAN INFLUENCES 
 
M’s application set out the ways in which he felt that publicity would 
seriously affect his private life, including the loss of contact for himself and 
his family with their local Muslim community, and “serious damage to his 
reputation.” (As noted, no allegations were made of risk of physical violence 
in relation to any of the applicants.)  According to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) the “rights of others”, which according to article 
10(2) might justify interference with freedom of expression, include article 8 
18 UKSC 2010 1 at para [47]. 
19 Ibid, at para [37]. 
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rights. Petrina v Romania confirmed that protection of a person’s reputation is 
a right that, as an element of private life, falls within the scope of article 8.20 
This followed the decision in Pfeifer v Austria which held that “a person’s 
reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, 
forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity.”21 In 
Karako v Hungary the ECtHR, after confirming that reputation was covered 
by article 8, concluded that there are escalating degrees of interference: the 
lowest involving “mere” reputation up to those which are held to undermine 
personal integrity and which will be regarded most seriously.22 The BBC 
case23 refers to Lord Hoffmann’s characterisation of a person’s reputation as 
an “immortal part of himself”. Further afield, in the UN’s International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “Unlawful attacks on…honour and 
reputation” are included with privacy, family home or correspondence in the 
protections provided by article 17.24
The Court undertook a comparative exercise which revealed a considerable 
use of anonymity of court proceedings in European jurisdictions, particularly 
in Germany where courts themselves do not mention the names of parties, 
possibly to reinforce appearances of impartiality, despite the fact that the press 
and wider public may know of and use the relevant names. In contrast, in the 
present case, the actions themselves have been heard in public, with 
anonymity not enforced against those in attendance save for the court 
attempting to control the actions of the press. 
 
Balancing Articles 8 and 10 
 
An early opportunity for the House of Lords to explore the interaction 
between articles 8 and 10 was provided by the case in which the model Naomi 
Campbell sued Mirror Group Newspapers due to its disclosure of “private 
information” concerning her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous.25 In 
holding that neither article 8 or article 10 had automatic priority, or even a 
presumption in its favour, Lord Hoffmann was of the opinion that both 
provisions reflect “important civilised values”.26 Often there will not be a 
20 Appl no 78060/01, October 14 2008 at para [19]. 
21 (2007) 48 EHRR 175, 183 at para [35]. 
22 Appl no 39311/05,  April 28 2009. 
23 [2009] UKHL 34 at para [7], as described in Jameel (Mohammed) v Wall Street 
Journal Europe Spr [2007] 1 AC 359 at para [91]. 
24 “1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.” 
25 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. 
26 Ibid, at para [ 55 ]. 
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conflict between the two, but such conflict would arise in situations in which 
one was necessarily compromised by protecting the values underlying the 
other. The extent of compromise of the one must be measured in proportion to 
the extent of need evoked by the other. “Proportionality” was said by Lord 
Steyn in S to provide the “ultimate balancing test”.27
 
THE PRESS PERSEPCTIVE  
 
In Re Guardian, Lord Rodger expressed one argument, which favoured 
article 10, in terms of concern for the journalist enterprise itself. “What’s in a 
name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer.” Under anonymity, the appellants 
would appear “disembodied”, while identification would make “more vivid 
and compelling” accounts of “wrongs done to them”.28 Without the use of 
names, the papers will be less likely to publish accounts due to lack of human 
interest and so less likely to stimulate informed debate on freezing orders.   As 
we have seen in the BBC case, this point is not new to the debate, and would 
be repeated, for example, in opposing John Terry’s recent attempt to conceal 
the less reputable aspects of his love life. 29 It would appear that stimulation 
of debate was something, which the appellants in Re Guardian had been 
prepared to forego in favour of personal protection, so they understandably 
regarded this argument as spurious. Regarding the potential impact on M’s 
family, it had already been acknowledged in S that impact on non-parties 
could in future be taken into consideration.30 The Court noted the obvious 
point that such impact was speculative or anticipatory in nature. 
Lord Rodger also felt that the anticipation of a damaging impact was 
founded upon assumptions made about public reactions to stories which 
would name the appellants, ie that those upon whom freezing orders had been 
imposed were at best disreputable and at worst guilty of terrorism, despite the 
reality that they had not been convicted.  Effectively the action claimed that 
the press should be prevented from publishing the truth for fear that readers 
might misinterpret it. The Lords’ approach here was reminiscent of that in the 
defamation case of Lewis v Daily Telegraph31 in which the City of London 
Fraud Squad was reported to be inquiring into the affairs of a company. The 
plaintiffs had claimed that this was defamatory of them because it implied 
guilt. The truth that there was such an investigation, based upon suspicion, 
could not be denied but it was the innuendo of guilt which the House of Lords 
rejected. According to Lord Devlin, “If the ordinary sensible man was capable 
27 [2004] UKHL 47, at para [17]. 
28 [2010] UKSC 1, at paras [63-65]. 
29 LNS v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB) at para [62]. 
30 [2004] UKHL 47 at para [32]. 
31 [1964] AC 234. 
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of thinking that where ever there was a police inquiry there was guilt, it would 
be impossible to give accurate information about anything…”32 Unlike the 
plaintiff in Lewis, the appellant M will not have the chance to challenge the 
substance of the implied allegation against him as he will not be brought to 
trial and so suspicions, which may be unfounded, are more likely to persist. 
Lord Hoffmann, in Re S, had followed Campbell in describing the element 
of public interest in the publication as a key element giving weight to freedom 
of expression. To constitute a “positive general interest supporting disclosure” 
was said in the important ECtHR case of von Hannover to require something 
more substantial than lightweight “infotainment”.33  In Re Guardian the 
Supreme Court relied on these precedents to take a strong stand on the 
importance of transparency or “open justice” in matters of “general public 
interest.” “The legitimate interest of the public is wider than that of judges 
qua judges or lawyers qua lawyers. The public has a legitimate interest in not 
being kept in the dark about who are challenging the TOs and the AQOs.”34 
To make an informed judgement the public need to know more, such as the 
fact that HAY has already successfully sued Home Secretary for wrongful 
detention. In order to debate the merits of the system, identification would 
enable the public to see how it “affects different people in different 
situations”.35  This is an “important public matter” not some trivial aspect of 
an individual’s private life and “publication of M’s identity would make a 
material contribution to a debate of general public interest.”36 Regarding the 
appellants themselves, “It is unusual, to say the least, for individuals to enter a 
debate, using highly charged language and accusing the Government of 
dishonouring a pledge, but at the same time to insist that they should have the 
right to hid behind a cloak of anonymity.”37 In view of the conclusion that the 
potential effect on M’s private and family life was “very general, and for that 
reason, not particularly compelling” the Court’s application of proportionality 
required that the full names of the five appellants were made explicit in both 
this and the substantive case. The decision was accompanied by an 
acknowledgment that nothing is risk free, although the apparent lack of 
impact to date consequential upon the earlier naming of Mr al-Ghabra 
supported a view that the risk would be a minor one. Most appropriately, the 
32 Ibid, at 286. 
33 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1. Here Princess Caroline of Monaco 
won a case concerning paparazzo surveillance in a semi-public place. 
34 [2010] UKSC 1 at para [68]. “TO” refers to the Terrorism Orders 2006 and 2009 
and “AQO” refers to the Al-Qaeda and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 
2006. 
35 [2010] UKSC 1 at para [69]. 
36 Ibid, at paras [73-75]. 
37 Ibid, at para [71]. 
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Press Complaints Commission should deal with any transgressions by the 
press.38
 
COMMENT 
 
It is arguable that Re Guardian indicates that the Supreme Court, at the 
outset of its new incarnation, is intent on reasserting the beneficial essence of 
the principle of open justice. Although, as we have seen, the terrorism 
legislation and related jurisprudence fall within the realm of administrative 
law, they are closely allied to the criminal law in substance. However the 
Supreme Court did not in any way confine its position on anonymity to 
criminal cases connected to terrorism and reserved its opinion on control 
order anonymity. The Court’s perspective was that the purpose of the freezing 
order is public and thus it constitutes “an important public matter.” 
Additionally, open justice as a value is given an intrinsic weight that many 
personal matters do not have. There is a contradiction implicit in this outcome 
because it appears that the more serious the (possibly implied) allegation 
which leads its individual subject to seek secrecy, the more likely there is to 
be a justifiable public interest generated, which may then make secrecy 
unsustainable.  
Admittedly it is based upon a relatively narrow point (the reporting of 
legal proceedings), but both in tone and in substance this decision of the 
Supreme Court may be indicative of a new stance towards the weighting of 
freedom of expression against privacy.  The Court goes further than merely 
applying a restrictive interpretation of reputation in the context of article 8: 
when there is a held to be high degree of general public interest in a case 
being reported then this can only be matched or overridden by a serious threat 
to personal integrity. 
It has been noted that Re Guardian was shortly followed John Terry’s 
failed attempt to prevent revelation of his extra-marital affair and the 
resurgence of public debate over the recall to prison of Jon Venables, who has 
been beneficiary of wide-ranging press restrictions. We see, then, that pleas 
for anonymity come from a wide range of sources and motivations and it is 
interesting to speculate whether such pleas are symptomatic of a some 
significant social trend or, more simply are a reflection of eagerness to test the 
boundaries of developing privacy rights under the Human Rights Act in the 
face of pervasive media scrutiny.      
38 An online search revealed very limited subsequent publicity given to personal 
information about the men, beyond their names and a summary of the suspicions 
about them. The Daily Mail published a photo of Mr al-Ghabra on October 28 2009. 
 
